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The European Community Rules on 
Competition: The Concerted Practices 
Doctrine 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 21, 1988, the Commission of the European 
Communities l (Commission)2 issued the PVC3 and LdPE4 deci-
sions.s In these two decisions, the Commission fined twenty-three 
major producers of thermoplastic products6 fifty million dollars7 
for participating in price-fixing and market-sharing cartels8 
throughout the European Community (Community). The Com-
mission found that several cartel members met regularly to co-
ordinate their prices for polyvinyl chloride and low density poly-
I The Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty) created the European Economic Community 
(Community) in 1957. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The original signatories of the EEC 
Treaty were the six West European states of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Id. Today, the number of Community 
member states is twelve, including, in addition to the original members, Denmark, Eng-
land, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. See 28 OJ. EVR. COMM. (No. L 302) 9; 3 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ ~ 7,001-7,708 (1989). 
2 The Commission of the European Communities (Commission) is a nine member panel 
appointed by the member states, acting in common agreement, and charged with the 
responsibility of implementing the provisions of the EEC Treaty in a manner independent 
of the desires of individual member states. EEC Treaty, supra note I, at arts. 155-63. 
s Decision 89/190, Commission Decision of 21 December 1988 regarding the Polyvinyl 
Chloride Cartel, 32 0.]. EVR. COMM. (No. L 74) 1 (1989); Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 
[1989] 1 CEC 2,167 [hereinafter PVC]. 
4 Decision 89/191, Commission Decision of 21 December 1988 on the Low Density 
Polyethylene Cartel, 32 0.]. EVR. COMM. (No. L 74) 21 (1989); Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 
[1989] 1 CEC 2,193 [hereinafter LdPE]. 
5 New Developments, Commission Imposes Heavy Fines on Plastics Sector Cartels, 4 Common 
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 95,032 at 51,104 (1989) [hereinafter Plastics Sector Cartel]. U[T]he 
Commission imposed fines totalling 60m. ECU [European Currency Units] on 23 major 
petrochemical producers which had taken part in two Europe-wide price fixing and 
market sharing cartels, one in LdPE (low density polyethylene) and the other in PVC 
[polyvinyl chloride]." Id. 
6 uLdPE and PVC are key intermediate products used by the plastics processing industry 
throughout the Community." Id. 
7 The current exchange rate is $1 to ECU 1.21364. Wall St.]., Feb. 2, 1990, at ClO, 
col. 4. 
8 See infra notes 72-94 and accompanying text. 
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ethylene.9 The Commission held that all cartel members, by virtue 
of their cartel membership, violated the Community rules on 
competition,1O specifically the prohibition of concerted price-fix-
ing practicesJl under article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC Treaty).12 In both deci-
sions the holdings rested largely on circumstantial evidence, de-
ductive reasoning,13 and an expanded application of the concept 
of concerted practices. 14 This incorporation, best understood as 
9 See infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text. 
IO See infra notes 91-94. The Community rules on competition are intended to ensure 
that businesses in the Community operate as independent competitors. See generally Suth-
erland, The Competition Policy in the European Community, 30 ST. LOUIS V.L.]. 149 (1985). 
Mr. Sutherland, the Commissioner in charge of competition policy at the time of the PVC 
and LdPE decisions, stated that the competition policy of the Community is part of the 
wider endeavor of European integration. Id. According to Sutherland, free competition 
is the best way to achieve the twin goals of a genuine "barrier-free internal Market" and 
of enhanced competitiveness of the European industry. Id. 
II See 52 LORD HAILS HAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 
19.33 (4th ed. 1986). Concerted practices essentially refer to informal business cooperation 
between alleged competitors who thus knowingly substitute practical cooperation for the 
risks of competition. Id. 
Id. 
12 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 85. Article 85 of the EEC Treaty provides: 
1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market 
and shall hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any deci-
sions by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely 
to affect trade between the Member States and which have as their object or 
result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common 
Market, in particular those consisting in: (a) the direct or indirect fixing of 
purchase or selling prices or of any other trading conditions; (b) the limitation 
or control of production, markets, technical development or investment; (c) 
market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply; (d) the application to parties 
to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; or (e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a 
contract to the acceptance by a party of additional supplies which, either by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contract. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be 
null and void. 
3. Nevertheless, the provision of paragraph 1 may be declared inapplicable in 
the case of: 
- any agreements or classes of agreements between enterprises, 
- any decisions or classes of decisions by associations or enterprises, and 
- any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which contribute to 
the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion 
of technical or economic progress while reserving to users an equitable share in 
the profit resulting therefrom, and which: 
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indis-
pensable to the attainment of the above objectives; 
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a 
substantial proportion of the goods concerned. 
13 PVC, supra note 3, at para. 23; LdPE, supra note 4, at para. 28. 
14 PVC, supra note 3, at paras. 25-26; LdPE, supra note 4, at paras. 30-33. 
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the Commission's solution to the noncooperative attitude of the 
thermoplastics industry in the PVC and LdPE investigations, ex-
panded the legal framework the Commission applied to enforce 
the Community rules on competition rigorously despite adverse 
circumstances. 
The Community rules on competition were ratified to create a 
Community characterized by genuine competition and an absence 
of trade barriers. I5 PVC and LdPE demonstrate that businesses 
currently active in the Community and those anticipating their 
future participation might encounter legal and financial predic-
aments by pursuing impermissible business associations. I6 The 
Commission's application of the concept of concerted practices 
in these two decisions restricts permissible contact between 
businessesI7 and may lead to hefty fines for businesses which 
breach their duty to act as independent competitors in the Com-
munity.IS 
Part I of this Note discusses how the European Court of Justice 
(European Court)l9 and the Commission defined concerted price-
fixing practices prior to the 1988 PVC and LdPE decisions and 
looks at the corresponding evidentiary requirements.2o Part II 
considers the PVC and LdPE decisions as examples of the Com-
mission's current expansive application of the concept of con-
certed practices.21 Part III analyzes the evolution of the concept 
of concerted practices in light of the recent PVC and LdPE de-
cisions.22 This Note concludes that the Commission's expansive 
application is consistent with its efforts to create a competitive 
and barrier-free Community by 1992. 
15 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 3. 
16 Commenting on the PVC and LdPE decisions, Commissioner Sutherland said that it 
was particularly important in the context of 1992 to ensure that competition in the 
Community was not distorted. He assured that the Commission remained determined to 
enforce the competition rules and to deter such behavior by imposing appropriate fines. 
Plastics Sector Cartels, supra note 5, at 51,105. 
17 See infra notes 1l0-1l7. 
18 PVC, supra note 3, at arts. I, 3. 
19 The Court of Justice of the European Communities (European Court) is charged 
with the duty to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the EEC Treaty, the 
law is observed. EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 164. The European Court can review 
acts of the Commission upon application by any natural or legal person who is directly 
and individually concerned by the Commission's acts. Id. at art. 173. 
20 See infra notes 23-69 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 70-118 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 119-142 and accompanying text. 
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1. CONCERTED PRACTICES BEFORE 1988 
Prior to the 1988 PVC and LdPE decisions, the European Court 
defined the concept of concerted practices in the 1972 Imperial 
Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Commission case23 and in the 1975 Eu-
ropean Sugar Cartel Cases (Sugar Cases).24 In these two judgments, 
the European Court held that businesses acting in the Community 
are prohibited from engaging in intentional parallel conduct 
which distorts free price competition,25 especially if the parallel 
conduct involves direct or indirect contact between businesses.26 
Two years later, the Commission decided the 1977 Vegetable 
Parchment decision27 on the same standards.28 
The European Court defined concerted practices in the context 
of price-fixing practices in the 1972 Imperial Chemical judgment. 29 
One of the issues in Imperial Chemical, 3D one of the Dyestuffs cases,31 
23 Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 619; [1971-
1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8,161 (1972) [hereinafter Imperial 
Chemical]. 
24 Cooperatieve vereniging 'Suiker Vnie' VA and Others v. Commission, Joined Cases 
40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, Ill, 113, and 114173, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1663; [1973-
1975 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8,334 (1975) [hereinafter Sugar 
Cases]. 
25 See Imperial Chemical, supra note 23, at 655-61. The parallel conduct discussed in 
Imperial Chemical consisted of multiple industry-wide price increases which were identical 
with respect to timing, the products affected, and the rates of increase. Id. at 657-58. 
26 Sugar Cases, supra note 24, at 1942. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
27 Decision 78/252, Commission Decision of 23 December 1977 on Vegetable Parchment, 
21 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 54; [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 10,016 (1977) [hereinafter Vegetable Parchment]. 
28 See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. 
29 Imperial Chemical, supra note 23, at 655. 
30Id. at 623. Imperial Chemical reached the European Court by way of Imperial Chemical 
Industries' (ICI's) action to annul the Dyestuffs Manufacturers Commission decision of July 
24, 1969, relating to proceedings under article 85 of the EEC Treaty. Id. at 622. The 
Commission in Dyestuffs Manufacturers imposed a fine of 50,000 units of account (EVA) 
on ICI for violating article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty together "with other undertakings in 
concerted practices for the purpose of fixing the amount of price increases and the 
circumstances in which these increases were to be introduced in the dyestuffs industry in 
1964, 1965 and 1967." Id. at 623. The decision also imposed fines of 50,000 units of 
account on seven other member state companies. Id. The European Court dismissed ICI's 
complaint thereby affirming the Dyestuffs Manufacturers decision. Id. at 664. 
31 See Dyestuffs Cases [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 
~ ~ 8,162-69 (1972) [hereinafter Dyestuffs Cases]. The Dyestuffs Cases involved uniform 
price increases by nine European manufacturers of dyestuffs, among them ICI of Eng-
land, Bayer and BASF of Germany, and Ciba and Geigy of Switzerland. Toepke, Pricing 
of Products in the EEC, 16 INT'L LAW. 233, 241 (1982) [hereinafter Pricing of Prod'UCts in the 
EEC]. Toepke states that "[t]he Commission suspected ajoint action among the competing 
firms and, in 1967, decided ex officio to initiate Proceedings under Article 3, Regulation 
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was whether the dyestuffs manufacturers' practice of publicly 
announcing their intention to increase prices at a future date and 
subsequently increasing prices simultaneously constituted a con-
certed practice under article 85( 1) of the EEC Treaty.32 The 
European Court held that this practice violated article 85( 1) of 
the EEC Treaty.33 
In Imperial Chemical, the European Court found that three 
uniform price increases in the dyestuffs market constituted a 
progressive cooperation between the enterprises.34 The European 
Court further found that the enterprises eliminated the risk of 
independent change thus temporarily eliminating competitive 
market conditions.35 The dyestuffs manufacturers claimed that 
the uniformity of the price increases resulted from the presence 
of a price leader in an oligopolistic market.36 The European Court 
conducted a market analysis to ascertain whether the dyestuffs 
manufacturers' claim could be sustained37 and concluded that the 
dyestuffs manufacturers engaged in a concerted practice in vio-
lation of article 85(1).38 The European Court reasoned that since 
the dyestuffs market was not an oligopoly, it was unlikely that 
three simultaneous price increases could have come about spon-
taneously on all the national markets.39 The similarities in the 
17/67, against a number of companies for alleged violations of Article 85." Id. The 
Commission alleged that the indicted companies had engaged in illegal concerted practices 
prohibited by article 85(1). Id. 
3. Imperial Chemical, supra note 23, at 653. 
33 Id. at 661. 
34Id. at 658. 
35Id. at 659. 
36Id. at 653. "[Oligopoly describes a] market condition in which the sellers are so few 
that the actions of anyone of them will materially affect the price and hence have a 
measurable impact upon competitors." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 866 (2nd 
ed. 1982) [hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY]' 
37 See Imperial Chemical, supra note 23, at 655-58. The European Court's findings 
included the following: 
In the territory of the Community, the market in dyestuffs in fact consists of 
five separate national markets with different price levels which cannot be ex-
plained by differences in costs and charges affecting producers in those countries 
.... [I]t is clear that each of the national markets has the characteristics of an 
oligopoly and that in most of them price levels are established under the influence 
of a 'priceleader', who in some cases is the largest producer in the country 
concerned .... [E]ven in cases where a producer establishes direct contact with 
an important user in another Member State, prices are usually fixed in relation 
to the place where the user is established and tend to follow the level of prices 
on the national market. 
Id. at 655-56. 
38 See id. at 661. 
39Id. at 659. The European Court continued to reason that "[a]lthough a general, 
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rates, timing, and range of products affected by the three price 
increases indicated a cooperation between the enterprises to elim-
inate the risks of competition.40 Imperial Chemical demonstrates 
that a business participates in a concerted practice when it inten-
tionally cooperates with alleged competitors in order to eliminate 
the risks of free competition in the Community.41 
The European Court explained that the concept of a concerted 
practice does not necessarily involve a formal agreement but can 
result from a cooperation between businesses manifested by their 
parallel conduct.42 Parallel conduct per se cannot be considered a 
concerted practice but is suggestive of one if it leads to abnormal 
competitive market conditions.43 The European Court seemed to 
define a concerted practice as parallel conduct which eliminates 
normal competition and does not arise spontaneously under nor-
mal market conditions,44 but results from intentional cooperation 
between alleged competitors.45 Thus, Imperial Chemical established 
parallel conduct, distorted competition, and intentional cooper-
ation as the three constitutive elements of a concerted practice.46 
The European Court in Imperial Chemical appeared to base its 
finding of a concerted practice on circumstantial evidence and 
deductive reasoning.47 After it established the existence of the 
first two elements, parallel conduct and elimination of competi-
spontaneous increase on each of the national markets is just conceivable, these increases 
might be expected to differ according to the particular characteristics of the different 
national markets." Id. 
40 Id. at 659-61. 
41 Id. at 661. 
42Id. at 655. 
43Id. 
44 Id. The European Court defined normal competitive market conditions as those in 
which price stability was achieved at the lowest possible level given the nature of a product, 
the size and number of the enterprises concerned, and the extent of the market. Id. 
4S Id. at 659. The European Court further explained that: 
Although every producer is free to change his prices, taking into account in 
so doing the present or foreseeable conduct of his competitors, nevertheless it is 
contrary to the rules on competition contained in the Treaty for a producer to 
cooperate with his competitors, in any way whatsoever, in order to determine a 
coordinated course of action relating to a price increase and to ensure its success 
by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to each other's conduct regarding the 
essential elements of that action, such as the amount, subject-matter, date and 
place of the increases. 
Id. at 660. For a critique of the European Court's affirmation of the conviction as lacking 
persuasiveness on the facts as they wp.re stated and used, see Mann, The Dyestuffs Case in 
the Court of justice of the European Communities, 22 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 35, 37-41 (1973). 
46 Id. at 655. 
47 See id. at 658-59. 
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tion, the European Court declined to explain them as sponta-
neous features of a competitive market by essentially deducing 
the existence of the third element, intentional cooperation, from 
the existence of the first twO.48 In other words, Imperial Chemical 
seemed to allow a finding of intentional cooperation between 
competitors to be based on a judicial refutation of economic 
theories that explain parallel conduct as the autonomous behavior 
of real competitors. 
In 1975, the European Court had a further opportunity to 
define concerted practices. In the 1975 Sugar Cases,49 the Euro-
pean Court expanded on the mandate underlying all Community 
rules on competition: businesses must conduct their Community 
affairs as independent operators. 50 The Sugar Cases demonstrate 
that business cooperation involving direct or indirect contact be-
tween alleged competitors is impermissible.51 
In the 1975 Sugar Cases, the European Court was asked to rule 
on the validity of the 1973 European Sugar Cartel Commission 
decision. 52 In this decision, the Commission held that the chief 
European sugar producers engaged in various concerted prac-
tices.53 The European Court annulled large parts of the Com-
mission decision. 54 While discussing the Community rules on 
competition, the European Court stated that businesses acting in 
the Community must operate independently and determine their 
business strategies without contacting competitors.55 The re-
48 See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text; see also LORD HAILSHAM, supra note 
11, at para. 19.34; Note, Article 85 and European Antitrust Litigation: A Search for Economic 
Balancing, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1292-94 (1975)(authored by Edwin H. Clock and John 
Jin Lee). 
49 Sugar Cases, supra note 24. For a brief discussion of the Sugar Cases, see Wolfe & 
Montauk, Antitrust in the European Economic Community: An Analysis of Recent Developments 
in the Court of justice, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 349, 385 (1978). In the Sugar Cases, "the 
main sugar producers in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy attempted 
to separate their national markets from each other, so as to allow each group of national 
producers sole access to its own market." Id. at 387. 
50 Sugar Cases, supra note 24, at 1942. 
51Id. 
5' Decision 73/109, Commission Decision of 2 January 1973 Regarding the European 
Sugar Cartel, 6 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 140) 17; New Developments, Community Sugar 
Producers and Sellers Fined For Antitrust Violations, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] Common 
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 9,570 at 9251·7 (1973) [hereinafter European Sugar Cartel]. 
53Id. at 9,281-82. 
54 Sugar Cases, supra note 24, at 2025. 
55Id. at 1942. Specifically, the European Court stated that "each economic operator 
must determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common 
472 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII, No.2 
quired independence strictly precludes direct or indirect contact 
between competitors lest they influence each other's conduct.56 
The Sugar Cases demonstrate that businesses violate article 85(1) 
prohibitions on concerted practices when they maintain direct or 
indirect contact with competitors. 
After the European Court decided Imperial Chemical in 1972 
and the Sugar Cases in 1975, the Commission issued the Vegetable 
Parchment decision on December 23, 1977 (Vegetable Parchment). 57 
In this decision, the Commission fined the principal European 
producers58 of vegetable parchment59 for violating article 85(1) 
through three concerted practices, one of which involved a price-
fixing scheme.60 In Vegetable Parchment, virtually all the manufac-
turers were members of the international trade association Gen-
uine Vegetable Parchment Association (GVPA).6J Through 
GVPA, the parchment manufacturers convened several meetings 
each year to set the rate of increase of vegetable parchment prices 
in the Benelux62 and Danish markets.63 At those meetings, the 
manufacturers generally set the rate and date of the next price 
increase.64 Subsequently, the price leader in each market sent the 
market including the choice of the persons and undertakings to which he makes offers 
or sells. " [d. 
56 [d. The European Court conceded, however, that the required independence does 
not deprive businesses of their right to adapt themselves to their competitors' conduct. 
[d. 
57 Vegetable Parchment, supra note 27. For a lucid discussion of Vegetable Parchment, see 
Pricing of Products in the EEC, supra note 31, at 244. 
58 Vegetable Parchment, supra note 27, at paras. 10-16. The following producers were 
involved: the German Feldmiihle AG, 4 P Nicolaus Kempten GmbH, 4 P Rube Gottingen, 
and Schleipen & Erkens AG (Feldmiihle, Nicolaus, Rube, and Schleipen & Erkens); the 
French Canson & Montgolfier, Daile & Lecomte, Les Papeteries Alamigeon & Lacroix 
(Alamigeon), and Vizille; the British Wiggins Teape, Ltd. (Wiggins); and the Italian 
CIMA, CRDM, and Cartiere Burgo (Burgo). [d. at paras. 10-15. All of these producers, 
except CIMA and CRDM, were at one point members of GVPA. !d. at para. 16. 
59 [d. at paras. 1-2. Vegetable parchment is a kind of wrapping paper which is imperme-
able to fatty substances and, to a substantial extent, water and gas. [d. 
60 [d. at paras. 78-80. The first concerted practice involved a distribution agreement. 
[d. at paras. 17-33, 55-62. The second concerted practice involved the exchange of 
information regarding prices and export quantities through GVPA. [d. at paras. 34-39, 
63-70. The third concerted practice consisted of regular meetings of the GVPA members, 
during which they determined the rate of price increases for those EEC markets without 
domestic producers. [d. at paras. 40-52, 71-73. 
61 [d. at para. 16. 
62 Benelux is an acronym for the customs union formed by Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 1472-73. 
63 Vegetable Parchment, supra note 27, at paras. 40-52. 
64 [d. at para. 40. 
1990] CONCERTED PRACTICES DOCTRINE 473 
new price schedules via the GVPA Secretariat to all GVPA mem-
bers for implementation.65 
In Vegetable Parchment, the Commission held that this practice 
clearly constituted a concerted practice of price-fixing in violation 
of article 85(1)(a).66 The Commission reasoned that the GVPA 
members could not fail to realize that their conduct had a signif-
icant anti-competitive effect and violated the Community rules 
on competition.67 The Commission fined68 all but three partici-
pating producers.69 
The Vegetable Parchment decision demonstrates that, prior to 
1988, the Commission seemed to follow the European Court 
implicitly in its definition and application of the concept of con-
certed practices by either generally prohibiting intentional co-
operation or, more specifically, prohibiting direct or indirect con-
tact between alleged competitors in the European Community. 
II. THE 1988 PVC AND LDPE COMMISSION DECISIONS 
The facts in PVC and LdPE were similar, and the Commission's 
legal theories identical. 70 This section focuses on PVC as an ex-
ample of the Commission's new definition and application of the 
concept of concerted pricing practices. 
In PVC, the Commission fined fourteen major producers of 
thermoplastic polyvinyl chloride 23.5 million European Currency 
Units71 (ECUs) for infringing article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty by 
participating in a cartel engaged in collusive pricing activities.72 
The Commission considered the cartel to constitute an 
agreement73 but held that the infringement constituted an 
65Id. 
66Id. at para. 71. 
67Id. at para. 84. 
6Bld. The fines imposed ranged from 10,000 EVA (European Vnit of Account) to 
25,000 EVA. Id. at art. 2. 
69Id. at para. 84. The Commission reasoned that since the three exempted manufac-
turers made few sales to the Benelux and Danish markets, their role in export price-
fixing was insignificant. Id. at paras. 41, 84. The Commission seemed to take a measured 
approach to punishing violations of article 85(1 )(a), reflecting its policy to make fines 
commensurate with both the "gravity and the duration of the infringement." Id. at para. 
81; see also Imperial Chemical, supra note 23, at 663. 
70 See Plastics Sector Cartels, supra note 5, at 51,104; compare PVC, supra note 3, at paras. 
28-38, with LdPE, supra note 4, at paras. 35-45. 
71 For the current exchange rate, see supra note 7. 
72 PVC, supra note 3, at arts. 1, 3. 
73 Id. at para. 30. 
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agreement and/or a concerted practice within the meaning of 
article 85(1).74 The Commission stated that it was not as important 
to distinguish agreements from concerted practices as to distin-
guish mere parallel conduct from conduct constituting a con-
certed practice under article 85(1).75 According to the Commis-
sion, the conduct of Shell Chemical International Co., Ltd. (Shell), 
whose involvement in the cartel was limited, best exemplified the 
scope of the concept of concerted practices. 76 
The producers fined in PVC were the fourteen major 
producers77 of polyvinyl chloride.78 These producers regularly 
met to coordinate and ensure the progress of concerted price 
initiatives.79 The Commission's three evidentiary pillars80 were 
planning documents found at Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. 
(ICI), ICI's testimony affirming the existence of the meetings, 
and internal pricing documents found at some of the producers' 
plants.8l The planning documents proposed a framework of 
meetings to implement quotas and a price-fixing scheme and 
recorded the generally positive response of the indicted produc-
ers.82 According to ICI's testimony, the proposed meetings took 
place approximately once a month from August 1980 through 
74 I d. at art. 1. 
751d. at para. 34. 
761d. 
771d. at para. 2. The producers were Atochem SA, BASF AG, DSM/NV, Enichem SpA, 
Hoechst AG, Huels AG, Imperial Chemical Industries pic, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij 
(LVM), Montedison SpA, Norsk Hydro AS, Societe artesienne de vinyl (SAV), Shell 
International Chemical Co., Ltd.(Shell), Solvay et Cie, and Wacker Chemie GmbH. /d. at 
art. 1. 
781d. at paras. 2-3. Polyvinyl chloride is a common thermoplastic resin used in a wide 
variety of manufactured products, including rainwear, garden hoses, and floor tiles. 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 963. Polyvinyl chloride is a "key 
intermediate product[] used by the plastic processing industry throughout the Commu-
nity." Plastics Sector Cartels, supra note 5, at 51,104. 
79 PVC, supra note 3, at paras. 7-9, 17-22. 
80 I d. at para. 21. 
811d. at paras. 7-8, 17. 
821d. at para. 7. In these meetings the following matters, among others, were to be 
discussed: 
Id. 
-the achievement of greater price transparency with a common European price, 
although importers might still be allowed a penetration margin (two per cent 
was suggested); 
-the machinery of price initiatives and measures designed to ensure they were 
sucessful [sic], including the discouraging of 'customer tourism' (buyers changing 
to a new supplier offering the lowest price). 
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September 1983.83 ICI provided a list of participants, which Ba-
dische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik (BASF) confirmed, and testified 
that each of the participants attended at least some of the meet-
ings.84 According to ICI, the participants discussed topics such as 
pricing and market shares but did not make firm commitments 
to each other.85 The Commission tried to obtain detailed infor-
mation about the meetings but most of the producers either 
claimed to be unaware of any meetings or to have no relevant 
details.86 The Commission consequently did not possess any rec-
ords or minutes of the meetings.87 With respect to internal pricing 
documents, the Commission found internal price directives at 
five producers' plants.88 These price directives often emphasized 
the need for sales offices to support price initiatives by confining 
sales to regular customers, allowing discounts only with head 
office approval, and even instructing sales personnel to refuse 
business rather than sell below list prices.89 The Commission 
requested documentation of internal price policy from the other 
nine producers but was told that producers routinely destroy such 
documents or such documents never existed.90 
In PVC, the Commission held that the direct documentary 
evidence, namely the 1980 planning documents, ICI's testimony 
of a system of regular meetings, and the internal documents 
relating to quotas and compensation schemes, was sufficient to 
prove the existence of a cartel. 91 Regarding concerted pricing 
practices, the Commission admitted that it was unable to show 
the number of meetings each producer attended92 or that the 
producers simultaneously introduced identical price lists.93 The 
Commission held, nevertheless, that the indicted producers 
8S I d. at para. 8. 
84Id. at paras. 8-9. The producers identified by ICI were Anic (now Enichem), Atochem 
(formerly Chloe), BASF, DSM, Kemanord (a division of Kemanobel), LVM, Montedison, 
Norsk Hydro, Enichem, Hoechst, Hueis, ICI, PCUK, SAY, Shell, Solvay, and Wacker. Id. 
at para. 8. 
85Id. 
86Id. 
87Id. at para. 9. 
88Id. at para. 20. 
89Id. 
90Id. 
91 Id. at para. 25. 
92Id. 
9S Id. at para. 20. 
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clearly infringed article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty and designated 
the producers' conduct as "an agreement and/or concerted prac-
tice" under article 85(1).94 
The Commission based its reasoning on the following concepts. 
The Commission adopted the European Court's definition of 
concerted practices as stated in Imperial Chemical and the Sugar 
Cases,95 introduced the concept of cartel,96 and asserted the valid-
ity of circumstantial evidence and deductive reasoning in deci-
sions involving concerted practices.97 The Commission defined a 
cartel as an association whose participants pursue a common 
unlawful goal for which they are responsible as a whole.98 Apply-
ing these concepts, the Commission found the existence of a 
cartel,99 concerted price initiatives between some cartel mem-
bers,lOo and concerted price-fixing practices by virtue of the pro-
ducers' cartel membership.101 
In PVC, the Commission based its finding of a cartel on evi-
dence directly relating the producers' conduct to the cartel's ac-
tivities. 102 The Commission's standard for concerted pricing prac-
tices no longer required a showing of a business's direct 
involvement in concerted pricing practices, but instead a showing 
of a business's membership in a cartel in which other members 
engaged in price-fixing activities. 103 Regarding the nature of the 
meetings, the Commission deduced from the original planning 
documents and from five producers' internal pricing documents 
that the meetings served to set price targets and coordinate price 
initiatives. 104 Based on the correspondence between the five pro-
ducers' internal price directives and specialist press reports,105 the 
Commission held that price initiatives between cartel members 
existed. l06 This holding applied to all members, not only to the 
94 [d. at art. 1. 
95/d. at para. 33. 
96 [d. at paras. 25-26. 
97 [d. at para. 23. 
98 [d. at para. 26. 
99 [d. at para. 25. 
100 [d. at para. 9. 
101 [d. at para. 26. 
102 [d. at para. 25. 
103 [d. at paras. 25-26. 
104 [d. at para. 9. 
105 [d. at para. 18. The specialist trade press regularly reports on periodic price initiatives 
by the industry identifying new target price levels and proposed dates of implementation. 
/d. 
106 [d. at art. 1. 
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five producers directly implicated by their internal price direc-
tives.107 Considering the price-sensitivity of thermoplastics and 
the full documentation obtained from five producers, the Com-
mission rejected the remaining producers' explanations regard-
ing absent internal price documents as mere excuses lOS and rea-
soned that all cartel members participated in concerted price 
practices by virtue of their cartel membership. 109 
The reach of this new standard of concerted practices is dem-
onstrated by Shell's limited involvement in the cartel. 110 The orig-
inal planning documents did not mention Shell as a potential 
participant in the future meetings. lll ICI and BASF named Shell 
as a participant in at least some meetings between August 1980 
and September 1983.112 Shell admitted to attending two meetings 
in 1983, and its internal documents showed that before these two 
meetings, it was informed of price targets. 113 Shell was the only 
producer that did not participate in the compensation scheme. 114 
The Commission conceded that Shell's involvement with the car-
tel was limited and that Shell had apparently ceased to participate 
in the arrangements by the time of the PVC decision. ll5 Because 
Shell's contact with the cartel nevertheless allowed it to adapt its 
market behavior,116 the Commission held that Shell engaged in a 
concerted pricing practice. 117 
PVC demonstrates that a business can be held, as a matter of 
law, to engage in concerted price-fixing practices in violation of 
article 85( 1) based on evidence which shows that a business is 
associated with a cartel and that some of the other cartel members 
participate in concerted price-fixing practices. llS The Commission 
thus established a third standard for concerted price-fixing prac-
tices. 
107 ld. at paras. 17, 20; art. 1. 
10Sld. at para. 20. 
109 ld. at para. 26. 
110 ld. at para. 34. 
1Illd. at para. 48. 
1I2ld. at paras. 8-9. 
m ld. at para. 26. 
1I4ld. 
1I5ld. at paras. 48-49. 
1I6ld. at para. 34. 
117 ld. at art. 1. Considering Shell's limited involvement, the Commission imposed a 
lower fine on Shell than on the other producers. ld. at para. 53. 
liS See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The Commission in PVC expanded the application of the con-
cept of concerted practices by incorporating it into the concept 
of a cartel. While adopting the European Court's definition of 
concerted practices in Imperial Chemical and the Sugar Cases, the 
Commission, in effect, substantially broadened the concept's ap-
plication. 1l9 In the 1972 Imperial Chemical judgment, the Euro-
pean Court seemed to define a concerted practice as an inten-
tional cooperation between businesses which distorted normal 
competitive conditions and which could manifest itself in the 
conduct of the parties. 120 The European Court deduced the ele-
ment of intention from the circumstances based on a total market 
analysis without explicitly stating that such deduction was a 
proper method of legal reasoning. 121 Imperial Chemical held that 
the intentional cooperation of the parties was established if their 
parallel conduct could not be explained as a spontaneous result 
of normal competitive market conditions. 122 The European Court 
thus relied on circumstantial evidence to establish a concerted 
price-fixing practice but, nevertheless, seemed to maintain that 
the evidence had to show a direct correlation between perpetrator 
and pricing activities: the indicted party had to engage in coop-
erative pricing activities. 123 The European Court did not seem to 
abolish this requirement in the Sugar Cases, where it further 
defined the kind of business conduct that violates article 85(1). 
The 1975 Sugar Cases defined a concerted price-fixing practice as 
consisting of parties directly or indirectly contacting each other 
in the process of designing their pricing policies and setting 
prices. 124 
The European Court's definition of concerted practices relating 
to price-fixing as illegal business contact in the Sugar Cases is 
consistent with its definition of concerted practices in Imperial 
Chemical. The Sugar Cases analysis can be understood as a special 
kind of an Imperial Chemical analysis. Unlike the Imperial Chemical 
definition,125 the Sugar Cases definition requires only a showing 
119 See supra notes 95-117 and accompanying text. 
120 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text. 
12. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
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of contact between competitors. 126 The contact standard, how-
ever, could conceivably be separated into three components which 
are equivalent to the Imperial Chemical definition: parallel conduct, 
distorted competition, and intentional cooperation. 127 After the 
Sugar Cases, absent a finding of contact, the analysis of concerted 
practices must presumably still be based on circumstantial evi-
dence and deductive reasoning derived from a comprehensive 
market analysis. 128 
Conversely, the European Court in Imperial Chemical seems to 
have anticipated the contact standard adopted in the Sugar Cases. 
Instead of the intentional cooperation test based on a total market 
analysis, the European Court could have applied the contact test 
established in the Sugar Cases and reached the same result. 129 The 
contact test is narrower in scope since it does not involve an 
analysis of the total market context and, thus, appears easier to 
apply.130 In this sense, the contact standard of concerted practices 
seems to provide the European Court, the business community, 
and the Commission with a reliable legal principle to design and 
evaluate competitive business conduct in the European Commu-
nity. 
The Commission in the 1977 Vegetable Parchment decision did 
not mention the European Court's definitions of concerted prac-
tices in either Imperial Chemical or the Sugar Cases, but its holding 
is consistent with both. Under the Imperial Chemical definition, the 
European Court probably would have viewed the repetitive meet-
ings in Vegetable Parchment as parallel conduct leading to abnormal 
competitive market conditions. 131 The prices arrived at by the 
GVPA members were not the spontaneous result of normal com-
petitive market conditions, thus presumably justifying the Euro-
pean Court's deduction of an intentional cooperation between 
the vegetable parchment producers. The Commission's holding 
of a concerted practice seems, therefore, consistent with the Eu-
ropean Court's definition of concerted practices in Imperial Chem-
ical. The contact definition established in the Sugar Cases, requir-
ing businesses to act independently, seemingly would have left 
126 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. 
129 See supra notes 32, 37, 55-56, and accompanying text. 
130 Compare supra notes 37-39 with notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
lSI Compare supra notes 39-40 with notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
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the outcome in Vegetable Parchment unchanged. 132 The vegetable 
parchment manufacturers had both direct and indirect contact 
with competitors, thus violating the Sugar Cases standard. The 
Commission's holding in Vegetable Parchment was therefore also 
consistent with the European Court's definition of concerted 
practices in the Sugar Cases. 
The Commission in Vegetable Parchment did not, however, spell 
out its own reasoning beyond asserting that the practices in ques-
tion had an anti-competitive effect and violated the EEC Treaty 
rules on competition. 133 In light of the clear connection estab-
lished by circumstantial evidence between the indicted party and 
concerted pricing activities, the European Court's requirement 
that circumstantial evidence directly implicate a perpetrator also 
seemed to have been maintained. 134 
The Commission abolished this requirement in PVC by apply-
ing the concept of a cartel. The Commission established a partic-
ular producer's participation in a price-fixing practice with cir-
cumstantial evidence not directly connecting the indicted party 
with collusive pricing activities. 135 The Commission in PVC ex-
plicitly adopted the implicit reasoning in Imperial Chemical which 
established an infringement of article 85(1) if elements of the 
infringement could be proven by logical deduction from other 
proven facts. 136 The Commission in PVC applied this method of 
reasoning in a context which seemed to extend to any infringe-
ment of article 85(1), while the context in Imperial Chemical was 
limited to collusive pricing. 137 The Commission in PVC deduced 
the existence of a cartel from circumstantial evidence and the 
participation of an individual producer in the cartel from that 
producer's participation in at least one of the cartel's activities. 13B 
A cartel member was consequently convicted of engaging in a 
concerted practice of price-fixing although the Commission had 
no direct evidence implicating that member in a price-fixing 
scheme. 139 
132 See supra notes 52-56, 63-67, and accompanying text. 
133 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text. 
136 See supra notes 47-48,95-109, and accompanying text. 
137 See supra notes 30-46, 98-101, and accompanying text. 
13B See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text. 
139 See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text. 
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Neither the Commission's method of reasoning in PVC nor the 
introduction of the concept of a cartel was based on the language 
of article 85( 1) of the EEC Treaty. 140 The Commission's reasoning 
is best understood as an effort to bring the implicated parties' 
suspected anti-competitive conduct within the bounds of the 
Commission's legal authority. The Commission's effort to enforce 
the law seemed to have been obstructed by the parties' noncoop-
eration which, in the Commission's view, seemed to involve the 
destruction of evidence relating to price initiatives and price di-
rectives. 141 The Commission, in response, applied the concept of 
concerted practices expansively and loosened the requisite stan-
dard of proof. 142 In PVC, the Commission demonstrated its de-
termination to enforce the EEC Treaty rules on competition vig-
orously and to be instrumental in the creation of an open and 
unified European Community by 1992. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission in PVC has shown that it will apply the EEC 
Treaty rules on competition broadly and rely on minimal circum-
stantial evidence and deductive reasoning to establish a violation 
of article 85(1). The Commission expanded a key concept under 
article 85(1), concerted practices, by merging it with the concept 
of a cartel. Most importantly, the Commission in PVC has dem-
onstrated that it will not succumb to the practice of noncooper-
ation by businesses obstructing the enforcement of the EEC 
Treaty rules on competition, but rather will adapt to such hostile 
behavior by applying its legal tools broadly. Therefore, the Com-
mission must be taken seriously as an increasingly important and 
forceful guardian of the EEC Treaty rules on competition and 
their purpose, the creation of an open and unified Community. 
140 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. 
142 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
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